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ABSTRACT 
This 'aper presents an overview of the Chilean adjustment experience of 
the past two decades. After reviewing the main policy issues during the period, 
the paper submits a discussion about the different phases that characterized the 
application of key economic reforms in the areas of macroeconomic management, 
market deregulation, trade opening and the financial and social sectors. The paper 
discusses the sequencing of policy measures and the likely implications of the 
chilean experience for other Latin American countries in need of structural 
adjustment. The paper argues that the adjustment process envisaged by most 
developing countries is necessarily lengthy, given that two successive phases 
should he typically distinguished --corresponding to stabilization and structural 
adjustment-- characterized by different emphasis in terms of macro and 
microeconomic policies. The paper also argues that appropriate labor market 
policies should be adopted early in the process, to facilitate the industrial 
restructuring and diminish the unemployment impact. Also, it indicates that 
proactive and reactive social policies are essential ingredients to smooth the 
transition and attaining the political sustainahility required for any reform package. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the present world recession, Chile figures among the most dynamic economies 
in the world, and a very noticeable exemption in Latin America. Twenty years ago, however, Chile was 
a typical LDC characterized by poor growth, substantial macroeconomic imbalances, low investment rates 
and a large and inefficient public sector, as well as by protective policies addressing specific industries 
and markets, producing a highly distorted resource allocation. The average per capita annual growth rate 
in the period 1900-1989 was approximately 1.3 percent, (Ferraro and Riveros, 1994), while inflation went 
from an average of more than 25 por ciento p.a. in the 1960s to a notable hyperinflation process in the 
early 1970s. In contrast, during the past eight years, the average per capita growth rate has been almost 
5.5 percent p.a., with yearly inflation rates averaging less than IS percent, and notably declining during 
the 1990s. Meanwhile, the investment rate in the 1990s has reached up to more that 25 percent of the 
GOP, which is substantially above historical averages, while the fiscal deficit over the past eight 
hasturned into a surplus, export growth is solid and the balance of payments situation appears quite 
sustainable. After being a typical inward-looking economy, Chile has become one of the most aggressive 
new exporting economies, has resisted well the recent negative financial developments after the Mexican 
devaluation, and it has become a attraction for foreign investors in natural resources-based industries, 
as well as manufacturing. With fairly low unemployment and notable macroeconomic equilibria, Chile 
enjoys a solid base from which to confront the challenge of improving social conditions. 
Some central lessons may he drawn from the Chilean economic experience for other Latin 
American countries seeking stabilization and adjustment. Nonetheless, important qualifications are 
indispensable with regard to the idea of replicating the chilean experiment, particularly considering the 
timing and political conditions that prevailed during the Chilean reforms.. Also, the significant social 
and political costs involved in attaining a sustainable structural adjustment, which would normally demand 
broad political consensus, should he carefully considered in the political economy context. Overall, the 
chilean experience reveals crucial lessons regarding the phasing and strategy of economic reforms. Two 
phases need to he distinguished in the adjustment process, featured by different emphasis on macro and 
microeconomic policies. First, in order to reduce inflation and improve the market's allocative efficiency, 
it is the need for stabilization, elimination of the most distorting trade restrictions, and reduction of the 
economic size of the State. Second, structural adjustment measures need to be adopted subsequently, 
particularly through strengthening privatization strategies, adopting labor market reforms, as well as 
export promotion policies and measures aimed at macroeconomic equilibria. The chilean 
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experience also indicates that reforms addressing the fluidity of the labor market and the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the social policy are paramount. Higher and persistent unemployment, and an 
unattended increasing poverty problem, resulted in Chile from the lack of appropriate labor market and 
social policies during the 1970s reform phase. The retbrm phase of the post 1985 period, on the 
contrary, was effectively accompanied by measures aimed at making the functioning of the labor market 
more fluid, and at building up more efficient social services. As a result of these measures, economic 
growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s has led to substantially lower unemployment, increasing real 
wages and labor productivity, and dropping poverty levels. 
This paper reviews the major stylized facts of the Chilean economic transformation that 
took place over the past two decades and examines the three major phases of that transformation: the 
stabilization phase ( 1974-I 982), the financial crisis and the post 1985 structural adjustment phase. ft 
discusses the implications of the Chilean experience for countries in need of stabilization and structural 
adjustment, especially with regard to the sequencing and coordination of economic policies. The paper 
concludes that a possible replication of the Chilean experience needs to he carefully considered at the light 
of the prevailing internal and external conditions in any given country. The paper begins with a 
discussion of the economic scenario of the 1970s and the most fundamental economic transformations of 
the first phase of the adjustment (section two), followed by a look at the financial crisis and at the policy 
approach used during the post-1985 period (section three), the implications of this adjustment experience 
for other Latin American countries (section four) and a summary and conclusions (section five). 
2. THE ECONOMIC SCENARIO OF THE 1970s 
2.1 The Socialist ExperIment (1970-73) 
The government of Dr. Allende pursued radical changes aimed at attaining lower 
inflation, a better income distribution and higher growth. Against the backdrop of the import 
substitution strategy Chile had followed since the 1940s, the chief elements of policy were a high level 
of state intervention in productive affairs, and expansionary wage, fiscal and monetary policies. For 
instance, during 1971 the fiscal deficit increased from 2.7 to 10.7 percent of the GDP, and credit from 
the Central Bank to the public sector increased by more than 110 percent (Table 1). On the external 
front, and partly as a result of a sharp drop in world copper prices -- Chile's major export at that time - 
- international reserves dropped dramatically (from $390 million in 1970 to $161 million in 1971) and 
a trade balance surplus of $156 million in 1970 became a deficit of $16 million in 1971. The policy 
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response to these external shocks fostered further distortions: for instance, significant quantity controls 
on imports were added to traditionally high tariffs rates, while real wages were allowed to grow in about 
22 percent in one yeart, at the same time that real interest rates were rising. 
The overheating of the economy created during 1971, created serious economic problems 
in the two following years. Maintenance of a progressive and revolutionary reputation was considered 
more important than reducing economic disequilibria (Larrain & Meller, 1990). In a typical Latin 
American fashion, the fiscal situation further deteriorated and no effort aimed at reducing expenditures 
was ever implemented. On the contrary, the need for transferring resources to a growing number of 
public enterprises --working in a scheme of low fixed nominal prices-- in combination with a dramatic 
drop in tax collection and growing inefficiency throughout the entire public sector, created additional 
pressures on fiscal accounts. The fiscal deficit expanded dramatically from 10.7 percent of the GDP in 
1971 to almost 25 percent in 1973 (Table 1, col.(7)), while the total quantity of money increased by 152 
and 363 percent in 1972 and 1973 (Table 1, col.(5)), and the yearly inflation skyrocketed to 260.5 and 
605.1 percent in these same years (Table 1, col.(4)). The productive sector --heavily intervened by the 
government and suffering from distorted input and output prices-- was characterized by a soaring black 
market and was both unable and unwilling to provide a supply response to any demand-driven policy. 
The evidence of economic mismanagement in 1970-73 is the combination of worsening 
deficits in both the fiscal and the external accounts, and slow economic growth. As heavier controls 
imposed by the government did not stop the increase in imports, and as exports did not show any positive 
evolution, partly due the drop in copper prices, the current account deficit increased from $189 million 
in 1971 to almost $400 million in 1972 and $270 million in 1973. In addition, the real GDP fell at rates 
of 1.2 and 5.6 percent respectively in 1972 and 1973, a drop which was also accompanied by a steady 
decline in investment from 16 to 8 percent of the GDP in 1970-73 (Table 1, col. (6)). Paralleling these 
See the series presented in Table 3, col. (2), corresponding to INE (National Bureau of Statisticsys 
Real Average Wage Index. In the case of manufacturing (col.(3)), this real increase was close to 10 
percent, similar to that of the hourly labor incomes for the urban informal sector (col. (4)). The series 
in col. (5) (Table 3) corresponds to the hourly labor cost expressed in US dollars; hence, the real increase 
of almost 60 percent in this indicator between 1970-71, could he partly associated to the increase in the 
nominal exchange rate (hrokers'market) of 50 percent in that period. 
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developments on the real side, a further decline in average real wages in 11.3 and 38.6 percent took place 
in 1972 and 1973, respectively2 (Table 3, Col. (2)). 
Instead of adopting sound adjustment policies, the government in.sisted that economic 
problems were due to a plot organized by the private sector and the political foreign intervention, it 
further insisted on seizing private firms and practicing expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. This 
strategy exacerbated the political turbulence, already high in 1973 due to severe product shortages across 
markets, and a critical and active political opposition. Although unemployment was fairly low thanks 
to public enterprises', and in spite of the effort to keep wages in line with the price inflation in 1972 and 
1973, through indexation mechanisms, the dramatic fall of real wages (Table 3) contributed to intensify 
the opposition from unions. Facing an active opposition from conservative parties, and having lost the 
support of key political and social forces which had supported the Administration in its beginnings, the 
Allende overthrowing was the tragic conclusion of a generalized crisis. 
2.2 The Economic Reforms of the 1970s 
The economic scenario created in the 1970-73 period in Chile constitutes a typical story 
of many Latin American countries in different periods during the post-WWII era. Independently from 
the heavy political emphasis of the socialist government of Dr. Allende, many countries in the region 
have typically suffered from an excessive fiscal expansion, distorted trade regimes, intervened financial 
markets, growing state intervention in production, misaligned relative prices, a relatively high hidden 
unemployment, and centrally fixed nominal wages. Although inspired in the idea of improving the 
income distribution and achieving a better resource allocation by means of a greater government 
intervention, these policies have instead resulted in high inflation, recession and soaring political 
2 See Table 3. Minimum Wages also dropped in both years in 5 and 50 percent, respectively, while 
manufacturing wages dropped by II and 39 percent . An additional source (The University of Chile's 
Labor Force Survey) shows a decline in informal sector wages by 28 percent only between 1972 and 
1973, after a small increase of almost 3 percent between 197 1-72, a result which is likely due to the fact 
that this survey only represents the urban Santiago Area. in contrast, total (dollar) labor costs (i.e. 
including fringe benefits) show a drop in 1972 and 1973 by 3 and 45 percent respectively (Table 3, 
column (5)). 
Unemployment rates reached the lowest historical level in 1972 (3.1 percent), and increased mildly 
to 4.8 percent in spite of the significant drop in GDP occurred during 1973, a result mainly due to a 
notable increase in public sector employment. 
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turbulence. Therefore, the condition of the Chilean economy in 1973, can he adopted as a classical one 
for an economy in profound need of both stabilization and adjustment. 
The post 1973 military government embarked upon intense economic reforms aimed at 
improving efficiency in the framework of an open economy.4 The adoption of fiscal restraint and the 
privatization of public firms were the main policy instruments in this regard, as they allowed the recovery 
of the real sector through a better guidance of markets by relative prices. The loosening of traditional 
wage and employment controls --both legal and administrative-- was another key reform area, as were 
deregulation of product markets, and the trade and financial openings. As a reallocation of productive 
resources could not work well on the basis of misaligned prices, the emphasis of the government 
immediately during the post 1973 period, was not SO much on achieving structural reforms allowing for 
higher productive efficiency, hut in reducing the presence of high inflation and restoring the allocative 
role of relative prices. It is important to say that, with no previous adjustment events of the magnitude 
foreseen in Chile after 1974, the economic policy design did not rely upon any former experience, being 
practically guided by general prescriptions of economic theory and the neoclassical paradigm. 
2.3 The Stabilization Program 
The Chilean economic reforms were initiated with a sharp stabilization effort in 1975- 
1976. A first phase of the stabilization program took place during 1974, when measures aimed at 
reforming central government institutions, as well as at privatizing firms previously taken over under the 
Aflende regime, were quickly implemented. By 1975, inflation was still above 300 percent p.a. (Table 
I, column (4)). To combat it, a dramatic drop in the fiscal deficit was achieved in one year,5 
accompanied by a tighter monetary policy. As a result, inflation was significantly curbed between 1975 
and 1978, and it continued dropping until 1981 thanks to the implementation of a nominally fixed 
exchange rate which, however, fostered serious problems with regard to the allocation of investment. 
The creation of a fiscal surplus was paramount to the success of the stabilization program, specially the 
adoption of market-oriented policies regarding public enterprises and the implementation of an across-the- 
board reduction in fiscal expenditures. 
See Edwards & Edwards (1987), Walton (1985) and Corho (1985). 
The fiscal deficit (measured against GDP) declined from 24.7 to 10.5 between 1973 and 1974. A 
further drop to 2.6 was achieved in only one year, between 1974 and 1975. All this adjustment took place 
basically through reduction in public sector expenditures. 
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The stabilization program produced a severe drop of the aggregate demand, leading to 
areal GDP decline of almost 13 percent in 1975 (Table I, col.(l)), thereby also involving a high social 
cost. In fact, the unemployment effect of the across-the-board reduction in aggregate demand was 
important: the rate of open unemployment reached to more than 26 percent in 1976 (Table 3). The drop 
in real wages, another key outcome of the 1975-76 stabilization effort, was also significant. Although 
the real minimum wage doubled between 1973 and 1975-76 (Table 3, Column (1)), all other real wage 
indicators (average, manufacturing and unskilled labor) experienced a severe drop during the stabilization 
period (Table 3). In addition, the stabilization effort seriously affected long run growth due to its 
negative effects on investment and wealth (Edwards, l985). 
2.4 Trade Reforms 
Chile, like most Latin American countries, largely pursued industrialization based on the 
creation of a sizable import substituting industry. High trade harriers, considerable inefficiency, 
discrimination against agriculture and growing government intervention in economic affairs were major 
outcomes of that policy (Corbo, 1985). Paradoxically, employment growth in manufacturing was 
negatively affected under this policy approach (Corbo & Meller, 1984), and labor market segmentation 
was made deeper due to the need tir labor protection and strong unionization. Moreover, the failure to 
achieve an efficient industrial sector demanded progressively higher protective barriers, leading to an 
average tariff rate as high as 105 percent by 1973 (Torres, 1982).6 
The post- 1973 reform aimed at sharply reversing import-substitution by means of a far- 
reaching opening up. The trade opening was expected to bring more investment and employment in the 
longer run, in productive sectors with comparative advantages in the international trade. However, the 
measure was, at the time, chiefly inspired in the need of attaining lower inflation. Nonetheless, the 
observed failure in achieving higher exports and more rapid growth of labor-intensive industries in 1974- 
1982 can he traced to two drawbacks: (I) the tariff reduction program did not start off with a very precise 
target, shifting several times the final tariff being pursued and creating uncertainty in investors1 
Ad-valorem tariff rates ranged from 0 to 750 percent, while import prohibitions applied to 187 
tariff classification, a 90 day import deposit requirement was in effect for 2,800 others and 2,300 
categories required special approval from the Central Bank. 
Initially, tariffs were planned to reach an average 60 percent by 1977. By 1975 average tariffs had 
reached 57 percent, while almost all quantitative restrictions were eliminated. In a second stage, a new 
structure with tariffs ranging from 10 to 35 percent, was achieved during the third quarter of 1977. 
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(Riveros, 1986); and, (2) the exchange rate was used as a stabilization device, particularly after 1978, 
producing a notable overvaluation which negatively affected expectations and export industri& (Corbo, 
1985h; Edwards & Edwards, 1987). In fact, the exchange rate was nominally fixed between 1979 and 
1982, in the basic aim of reducing the inflation rate which, despite the fiscal and monetary disciplines 
already in place, was in 1979 still around 39 percent. Besides, amid high domestic interest rates and a 
growing peso appreciation, the economic authority decided to further open the capital account; in a period 
of a rapidly expanding world credit market, the immediate result was a heavy external indehtness9. In 
addition, to the macro imbalances generated by the debt problem (Edwards & Edwards, 1987), this policy 
allowed large firms to adopt more capital-intensive techniques, thereby negatively affecting employment 
growth in expanding activities. 
2.5 Privatization and Public Sector Reforms 
Another key set of refbrms after 1973 aimed at reducing the economic size of the State 
through reducing real government expenditures and privatizing public firms. The share of public firms 
in the GDP, which reached 14 percent in 1965, was as high as 39 percent in 1973 (Hachette & Luders, 
1987). Another indicator of the growing size of the State during those years is the relative importance 
of total public employment--i.e., including civil service, local governments and public firms— which 
reached about 14 percent of total employment in 1973 (likely about 36 percent of total formal 
employment), after having grown 38 percent between 1970 and 
To reduce the economic size of the State, a major privatization program was 
implemented, concurrently with policies aimed at achieving more efficient services and a smaller state 
Finally, a more radical reform allowed the average nominal tariff rate to reach an uniform 10 percent by 
late 1977. 
After unification of the exchange rate in 1973, an initial 300 percent devaluation and a series of 
mini-devaluations, the real exchange rate reached a peak value by late 1975. Subsequently, the real 
exchange rate declined sharply concluding in a 10 percent appreciation in june 1976. Real peso 
appreciation continued being used as a stabilization device through a system of devaluations that allowed 
for certain real appreciation. However, inflation did not drop as expected. From June 1979 a nominally 
fixed exchange rate was implemented and maintained until mid-1982, when dramatic peso devaluations 
took place in the wake of the world recession. 
The total external debt increased from US$8.5 billion to 17.1 billion in the period 1979-82. 
'° In 1970 about tO percent of the labor force was employed in the public sector. This proportion 
declined to 7 percent by 1980 and to about 5 percent in 1988 (Hachette & Luders, 1987). 
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sector. Firms expropriated during Allende's socialist experiment were immediately privatized: by the 
end of 1974, 202 out of 259 firms had been returned to their owners (Larrain, 1988). Most of these firms 
were operating at substantial losses, and a condition for returning them to their original owners was that 
they had to assume all accumulated debts and waive any possible damage claim against the government. 
Additionally, a sale of assets owned by the State was quickly implemented with most bank shares (US$ 
171 million) and a significant part of the industrial property (US$ 58 million) being cold by 1975.u 
Since parastatals' share in GDP dropped only from the 39 percent seen in 1973, to a still 
high 24 percent in 1981, an additional privatization effort took place at the time of the crisis of the I 980s. 
Of Chile's 100 largest flOfl financial enterprises, according to book value, the companies in which the 
state owned 50 percent or more of the shares at the end of 1976 accounted for 79 percent of total assets 
and 81 percent of total worth (IBRD, 1979). Moreover, by 1981 the state controlled all of the top ten 
enterprises in the country (Copper, Steel, Telephones, Energy, Coal Mining etc.) raising questions about 
the sustainahility of the adjustment effort. 
2.6 Markets 
A top priority of the post-1973 reform program was the improvement of resource allocation 
through an efficient free market system. Hence, and countering a historical tradition of price fixing, price 
regulation was almost completely eliminated at onc&2, including control of interest rates and the several 
quantitative constraints existing for capital market operations. The increased market competition faced 
the private sector with the need of improving productive efficiency, causing several bankruptcies during 
the transitional period. 
The wave of deregulation also reached the labor market, which was considered a crucial 
area after a period of acute government intervention and union activism. A partial liberalization in wage 
setting schemes was achieved, and adjustment measures aimed at eliminating overemployment were also 
encouraged by the government, particularly in the case of public firms. However, more than attempting 
the replacement of traditional labor market regulations by measures providing for more flexibility, 
policies measures aimed at simply dismantling the institutional arrangement of the labor market. Hence, 
This was a year of unprecedented economic decline (GDP felt by 12.9 por ciento), thereby 
originating unprofitable sales. At the same time, firms were sold below their book values, although still 
above their stock market value (Larrain, 19871. 
12 After an era in which more than 3,000 prices were set and eventually controlled by the authority, 
only 33 commodities remained under control, most of them utilities. 
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collective bargaining and union activities were eliminated simultaneously, while job security regulations, 
which aimed at making labor dismissals relatively more expensive, were also eliminated: after 1973 
massive labor dismissals required only a simple administrative authorization from the government. 
Moreover, unions were de facto eliminated, their leaders being hand-picked by the government itself. 
Therefore, the private sector was given full power to implement its preferred employment-wages strategy. 
The absence of a legal framework for the labor market during most of the 1970s was, 
nonetheless, a factor which fostered unfavorable expectations in the private sector. During the entire 
period 1973-1979 no new legal provisions governed labor relations, inter-alia, in connection with 
procedures for wage bargaining, job security, the right to strike, negotiation of working conditions and 
union activities. After a long history of labor market intervention, and as private employers may have 
envisaged a return to an environment characterized by confrontations with the unions, the legal vacuum 
of 1973-1979 did not favor a more labor-intensive production technology. On the other hand, minimum 
wages and non-wage cost regulations were upheld by the military regime, and a wage indexation system 
was implemented, although with little real effects given the lack of appropriate enforcement [Edwards 
& Edwards (1987), Riveros (1986)1. These particular interventions were, however, apparently reason 
enough to foster segmentation of the labor market, making wage adjustment and the inter-industry labor 
mobility far more difticult (Riveros & Paredes, 1990). 
The social cost of the adjustment, as indicated by alternative poverty measures, the 
unemployment rate, the observed drop in real wages and the deteriorating income distribution, was 
notably high. The particular political situation in which the adjustment program was implemented was 
the key to attaining such sustainable retirms and to avoiding policy reversals even in the presence of high 
social cost. During this first phase of the adjustment, not enough proactive or reactive labor and social 
policies were implemented. The only important one was the creation of an unemployment subsidy which 
operated through public works. However, no special training or retraining programs were in place, nor 
any employment information system that would have allowed fir a higher labor mobility. The fiscal 
restraint needed to attain the stabilization target, at the same time, created strong financial pressures on 
social sectors which, in the absence of specific measures aimed at improving their targeting criteria, did 
not fulfill the role of an efficient reactive program. 
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3. THE 1982 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE POLICY RESPONSE. 
The 1982-1984 financial crisis brought another sharp economic decline in Chile, amid 
serious balance-of-payment problems. Afterwards, due to sharp devaluations of the exchange rate, 
combined with expenditure reduction and other policies aimed at affecting expectations, increasing savings 
and promoting exports, the economy experienced a notable export-led economic expansion. The situation 
of the Chilean economy after the financial crisis resembles the circumstances of many other Latin 
American countries that, either after stabilization or in absence of inflationary episodes, are in need of 
structural adjustment policies to correct resource misallocation and improve balance of payment results. 
Domestic economic policies introduced at the end of the 1970s created macroeconomic 
disequilibria which, in turn, led to unsustainable high expectations and, ultimately, to a disruption in the 
economic recovery initiated in 1976. These policies included the nominal fixing of the exchange rate 
aimed at reducing price inflation, an approach which was also used in other Latin American countries, 
such as Uruguay and Argentina Similarly, the full opening of the capital account under a fixed exchange 
rate, produced large capital inflows and heavy external indebtness. This combination of policies was still 
more burdensome under the binding full indexation of wages to past inflation introduced in the 1979 labor 
law, which resulted in increasing production costs for exporters. As the production of non tradahies was 
being fostered by economic policy, large capital inflows financed an otherwise unsustainable expansion 
of private consumption and investment. 
Optimism about future trends were based on the stable growth path of the economy seen 
since 1976, the balanced public budget, the sustained improvement in real wages after 1975 and the 
opening of the economy. But the financial boom of 1979-1981 was basically financed with foreign credit 
generously provided in an expansionary period of world financial markets, with little resources being 
allocated to productive investment, particularly in export-oriented activities. The magnitude of the 
financial crisis Chile underwent in 1982-1984 is revealed by the increase of the external debt, from 2.7 
times total exports in 1979, to 4.6 times in 1983 (Table 2). As a share of the GDP, the external debt 
increased from 4.0 percent to tOO percent between the same years, while yearly interest payments 
increased from 3 to 10 percent of GDP. At the same time, and due to an early policy reaction to the 
crisis, the value of imports in real terms declined by more than 40 percent in 1982 (Table 2), triggering 
a GDP drop of more than 14 percent (Table 1), which was accompanied by an equally dramatic decline 
in aggregate investment, thereby negatively affecting future growth. The magnitude of the external shock 
is seen in the drop in terms of trade (from 119 in 1979 to 88 in 1983), and the increase in real (LIBOR) 
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interest rates)' The sharp curtailment of capital inflows in early 1982 amplified the problem and led the 
economy into a deep recession in 1982-1983. 
3.1 The First Phase of The Structural Adjustment of the 1980s 
During 1979-1981 the authorities shifted their attention away from stabilization policies 
and toward structural adjustment. A series of reforms addressed traditional social policies with the aim 
of decentralizing administration and targeting social expenditures to the poor more effectively. In 1981 
a key change to the social security transformed it from a pay-as-you-go system to one in which benefits 
depended only on individual contributions to a privately managed saving accounts system. This change 
was vital to allow for a successful privatization program given the significant potential of the social 
security to accumulate savings and mobilize financial resources. 
A major concern raised by the adjustment already experienced in l976-8l was the social 
dimension. Unemployment had not returned to its more normal 1960s 'levels, despite the recovery seen 
in most other economic indicators by the end of the 1980s. Also, the most important criticism on the 
economic program was the social impact manifested in a deteriorating income distribution and an 
increasing poverty problem. For instance, the Gini coefficient for the income distribution had reached 
a value of about 0.47 in the mid-1960s, and remained above 0.51 in the period of economic recovery 
1978-1982; the income share of the poorest dramatically felt from almost 13 percent (1960s) to less than 
11 percent in 1980 (Table 4)14, while the fiscal expenditure plummeted and the efficiency of the social 
services was wanting. It was then clear that a social strategy was needed in order to attain political 
sustainahility for the structural adjustment phase. Also, as the labor market provided a poor response 
to the need of reallocating labor from contracting to expanding industries, reforms aimed at making its 
role more dynamic and flexible were of paramount importance in order to attain lower unemployment. 
A health system reform was implemented in 1981, to increase the participation of the 
private sector by allowing the formation of private insurance companies providing paid health care. This 
reform was implemented while public sector social services (health and education) were being 
See, Corho & Sturzenegger (1988). Between 1978 and 1984 the real LIBOR increased from a level 
of I. I percent to a 6. I percent. 
14 To this respect, see also Table 5, which shows that the share of the poorest quintile fell 
dramatically between 1980 and 1982, and that a noticeable improvement in 1988. 
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decentralized; the central Ministries retained responsibility for policy formulaiion, hut not for direct 
administration of personnel and the budget. Hence, both education and health units were transferred to 
local governments, making them directly responsible for their administration and all functional outcomes. 
Similarly, a system of targeted assistance program, in the form of monetary subsidies for the poor, the 
elderly and the unemployed, was put into functioning or somewhat improved. These changes were 
important during the stage of recovery from the world recession, as they allowed for a better targeting 
of fiscal social expenditures to the poor, enabling for a more decentralized budgetary programming. 
Later, it would he realized that local government were unprepared to effectively manage education and 
health, specially because their participation in budgetary programming was lacking. 
With regard to the aim of making the labor market more flexible and responsive, a new 
labor law was enacted in 1979, which established new guidelines for unionization and collective 
bargaining procedures and very much used the U.S. system as a guideline. Countering a tradition in 
Chile, more than one union was allowed per enterprise, wage bargaining could only be done at the firm 
level (reversing the tradition 
of industry-level wage 
bargaining) and the right to 
BOX 1: RESULTS OF TILE 1984-85 ADJUSTMENT 
strike was curtailed through 
granting firms the right to 
hire temporaries. In 
addition, the law established 
the principle of voluntary 
affiliation to unions and 
banned the right of public 
employees to strike. Finally, 
the law substantially reduced 
job security payments, and 
instituted a 100 percent wage indexation to past inflation as a floor for any wage negotiation. This latter 
measure was singularly problematic in presence of the fixed nominal exchange rate regime prevailing in 
1979- 1982. 
In 1984-85 a so called "adjustment-without-recession" approach was used to face the 
financial and external crises. The GDP decline in 1982-83 had accumulated an almost 15 percent, while 
the gross investment had dropped by even more (Table 1, Cols. (I) and (6)). The policy approach -- 
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which has been widely used in the region at different times by countries trying to get out of economic 
chaos-- consisted in fostering aggregate demand to encourage output growth, based on expanding fiscal 
outlays and the external indehtness. As a result, the external debt further increased from US$17.4 billion 
to US$ 18.9 billion in 1983-84 (Table 2; Fig. 5). Also, in this same period, the real exchange rate 
depreciated not as fast as it should he (Table I, col. (9)) leading to a rather modest increase in exports 
of 7 percent (which was also notably fbstered by continuously dropping terms of trade, as suggested by 
Fig. 6) while an import expansion of 16 percent was also taking place. Hence, the approach doubled the 
current account deficit, resulted in reserve losses of about 8 percent between 1984 and 1985 (which 
occurred on top of the 50 percent lost in 1980-83) and made profuse use of 1MF credits (Box 1). 
Furthermore, this adjustment approach conveyed an increase in the fiscal deficit from 4.0 to 6.3 percent 
of the GDP, which was the highest figure in the post 1974 period, thereby leading to certain inflationary 
pressures in 1985 (Table I). As figures in Box 1 indicate, the fiscal deficit was indeed associated to the 
increase in expenditures, rather than to dropping revenues Although economic growth occurred at 6.3 
percent in 1984, the availability of external resources posited a tough constraint to the planned expansion 
in aggregate expenditures, making the recessionary effect even worse after that year. 
What the economy needed to face the recession were sensible policies aimed at encouraging 
exports and at continuing with the plan of structural reforms initiated in the late l970s. After having 
experienced the failure of the traditional policy approach to get the economy out if the recession, and 
back to a sustainable growth track, the government changed its mind regarding the macro policy 
management. Since 1985 it took the decision of continuing with the program started in the l970s, based 
upon restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, and the increasing role of the market and the private sector 
in resource allocation, and the fostering of sectors with a comparative advantage in production as a key 
growth strategy. The government realized that the exchange rate should play a key role with regard to 
developing a more dynamic export base, and that the need of promoting investment, both domestic and 
external, required providing adequate signals to investors on the institutional character of the economy 
and its expected evolution. 
3.2 The Second Phase of the Structural Adlustment 
After 1985, the adjustment program pursued the maintenance of a high real exchange rate, 
introduced a program to continue the privatization of public firms and control of fiscal expenditures, 
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created mechanisms to convert external debt into domestic investment,'5 gave specific incentives to 
exports, and strengthened a system to target social expenditures to the poor. The economy resumed 
strong growth (more than 5.5 percent p.a. in 1986-1988), led by a large expansion of non-traditional 
exports, and a significant increase in private investment. A policy aimed at introducing a systematic real 
exchange rate devaluation (Table 1; Figure I), accompanied by other standard export promotion policies, 
was a key element in attaining a strong economic growth, thereby also resulting in declining 
unemployment rates and expanding average real wages (Table 3 and Figure 4). The latter outcome was 
strongly linked to the increase in labor productivity associated to the expansion of new export industries. 
Fiscal and monetary discipline --which would be ratified by the end of the decade by transforming the 
Central Bank into an autonomous institution-- resulted in dropping inflation rates (Table I and Figure 
3) at least until 1988. As a matter of fact, inflation behaved rather erratically after 1985 and it has shown 
a notable persistence which produced a level still above 27 percent in 1990's. 
A key element in promoting exports was introducing a sharp devaluation of the real 
exchange rate (Figure 1). The increase in the relative price of tradable to non-tradables, produced 
substantial factor mobility towards export and import substituting industries, producing positive trade 
balance results. The increasing capital inflow and the expanding domestic investment, jointly with a 
growing and more efficient financial sector, enabled a satisfactory intersectoral capital mobility and a 
substantial productive expansion. A well functioning labor market allowed for the labor reallocation 
needed after the recessionary shock, as suggested by the notable drop in unemployment seen between 
1986 and 1990 (Tab'e 3, Col.(6); Fig. 4). As it has been shown (Paredes & Riveros, 1993), the 
employment-output elasticity structurally increased after the labor market reforms of the early 1980s. 
These reforms fostered greater inter-industry labor mobility and higher a flexibility, since the new job 
security norms made the hiring and firing processes less expensive, allowing for effective reentry of the 
unemployed. The reaction of wages to observed developments with regard to unemployment was 
sluggish; average wages first dropped between 1986-87, increasing afterwards at 4 percent p.a. (Table 
3, Col. (2)). In manufacturing, wages increased since 1985 at a similar yearly rate. Also, the real 
minimum wage grew at 9.5 percent p.a. after 1987, while the wage of unskilled labor --characterized by 
Which has yielded a drop in the total external debt in more than 10 percent. 
A factor underlying the persistence of the inflationary record is the existence of widespread 
indexation mechanisms, which comprehend all financial obligations and rental prices, thereby introducing 
downward inflexibility in output prices. Until recently, and in spite of the conservative macro and fiscal 
framework in place, the chilean inflation has remained well above the international inflation. 
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a real cut by half between 1982-87-- increased by an average 12 percent p.a. after this years. It is also 
interesting to note that total labor costs also increased at ii percent p.a. after 
The privatization 
strategy fulfilled a key role 
during this second phase. As - 
a result of the debt crisis of 
1982-84, the financial system 
was in a very difficult 
situation. Largely indebted 
and depicted by a very low 
public credibility, most of the 
banks were unable to produce 
the capital mobility needed to 
start a meaningful recovery. 
However, a market solution, 
which would have implied the 
bankruptcy of important 
banks indebted beyond their 
capital, would have produced 
a clear negative impact on the 
credibility and viability of the 
chilean economic model as a 
whole. Therefore, solving 
the debt problem of the banking system and, in several cases, the actual property condition of financial 
institutions, were considered a top priority. This gave rise to a policy scheme by the issuing of shares 
was implemented to he sold openly to small investors. This capitalization strategy --literally, a "rescue" 
operation-- originated a huge long term debt of most of the beneficiary banks with the Central Bank, 
As explained above, total labor cost.s include fringe benefits paid to unskilled labor in 
manufacturing. The drop of the unskilled wage vis-a-vis the average wage seems to support the idea 
presented by Robbins (1995) in this same volume, in the sense that the trade opening resulted in an 
expansion in the skilled/unskilled wage gap. However, the strong growth in labor costs after 1985 (at 
an average of 7.6 percent p.a.) vls-a-vis the expansion shown by the average real wage in the same 
period (3.7 percent p.a.) raises questions with regard to this observed result. (see, also, Table 3 Col (7)). 
BOX 2: STRUCTURE OF CHILES SOCIALSPENDING 
Health Education Housing S.Security Other 
1970 18.0 41.5 9.6 26.9 3.9 
(1.6) (3.8) (0.9) (2.5) (0.4) 
1975 16.3 34.8 8.6 25.9 14.4 
(1.7) (3.6) (0.9) (2.7) (1.5) 
1980 14.0 33.5 5.5 29.5 17.5 
(1.4) (3.4) (0.6) (3.0) (1.8) 
1985 7.1 24.6 4.4 41.3 22.5 
(1.1) (3.8) (0.7) (6.3) (3.4) 
1989 7.5 27.7 6.0 49,4 9.4 
(2.2) (2.8) (1.1) (6.7) (1.1) 
1990 7.5 27.7 6.6 52.4 5.8 
(2.1) (2.7) (1.1) (6.9) (1.1) 
1991 8.5 25.0 7.7 49.8 9.0 
(2.4) (3.1) (1.3) (6.7) (1.2) 
1992 9.3 25.4 8.5 47.2 9.6 
(2.6) (3.1) (1.3) (6.6) (1.2) 
Sources: Central Bank (BoletIn 796; 1994); Taller de 
PolItica Fiscal (J. Yañez) The series are not directly 
comparable after 1989. Figures are expressed as a proportion of 
the social fiscal expenditure. Between brackets, as a proportion 
of the GDP. 
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which provided the credit to purchasers of the new shares. This "popular capitalism" solved the property 
problem as, in the case of largely indebted banks, it was politically unpalatable to return all of the now 
more available banking assets to large private interest groups. 
By 1985 many large enterprises still remained in state hands. The decision of initiating 
a radical transfering of most of them to private hands was based upon the need of reducing their likely 
negative impact on fiscal accounts. More importantly, however, were the needs of improving their 
productive efficiency, and giving adequate signals to foreign creditors about the transformations being 
implemented and the indisputable leading role allotted to the private sector in the economic strategy. 
Large public enterprises were sold either through open stock market operations, or by means of direct 
allocation of share&B. Energy was one of the sectors privatized through a direct selling of shares to small 
investors, in order to which a longer term credit line was irkstituted by the government. By the same 
token, the telephone company, the steel industry, coal mining and other secondary industries still in State 
hands at the beginning of the I 980s, were transferred to the private sector. At the same time, policies 
addressing the need of attracting capital were implemented, specially by allowing the 
transformation of external debt into external investment through debt-equity swaps operations managed 
by the Central In sum, the Chilean economy introduced changes in the areas of state property 
and external debt management, which allowed continuing with the implementation of a macro framework 
aimed at encouraging growth and exports, at the same time of giving a more prominent role to the private 
sector in resource allocatkrn. 
3.4 The Distribution Effects of the Adjustment Program 
The economic reforms of the I 970s exerted major effects in terms of the labor market. 
Open unemployment increased from the average 6 percent of the labor force seen in the 1960s, to more 
than 16 percent during 1974-1981 (Table A major cause of the higher unemployment of 1974-76 
was the productive shock derived from both the stabilization program of 1975-76 and the initial phase 
This was, for instance, the case of public employees choosing to get shares of the Energy Company 
(ENDESA) using their severance funds. 
Chilean debt bonds were marketed at that time at about 50 percent of their face value. - 
20 This average includes unemployed individuals participating in Emergency Employment Programs 
(EEG). If EEG members are excluded, the average unemployment in 1974-81 reaches about 13 percent 
of the labor force. 
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of the opening of the economy. It is considered (Riveros, 1985) that the reduction in public sector 
employment and the higher growth in labor force participation were also major factors underlying the 
unemployment increase seen in this period. The government reacted by creating emergency employment 
programs in 1976, which provided modest money subsidies for the urban joihlunemployed, contributing 
to reduce the social impact of open unemployment, hut also to boost participation of secondary labor 
force. 
Even in presence of a strong economic recovery in 1976-1981, open unemployment 
remained high relative to the historical standard (Table 3). To a large extent, the persistence of abnormal 
unemployment levels relate to the substantial shift in production that was occurring in the economy as 
a consequence of the open trade regime. As a substantial skill mismatching prevailed in the labor force 
and no institutional mechanism was prepared to provide with a proactive answer (Riveros, 1986), 
transitional and mismatch unemployment were high. At the same time, an intense change towards capital- 
intensive techniques was taking place in production, particularly in manufacturing and services, leading 
to a structurally higher open unemployment. This latter outcome derived from the wrong signals emanated 
from the lack of suitable definitions on the institutional environment that was going to prevail for the 
labor market after a period in which the law had been virtually suspended. The financial and productive 
crisis of 1982-84 produced additional pressures on the labor market, on top of the already high 
unemployment existing in 198 121: unemployment rates skyrocketed, reaching as high as 30 percent of the 
labor force in 1983 (Table 3), a demand-driven result, since participation rates did not notably change 
during the recession. Later, as a result of a strong economic recovery and a more fluid labor market, 
unemployment sharply dropped since 1985 leading to a level close to the natural rate in the early l990s. 
A related labor market outcome was the drop in real wages in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Real wages declined by about 50 percent in 1972-75 (Table I Col. (2)) and notably recovered until 1981 
at an average rate of 9.5 percent p.a., an outcome which took place regardless of the presence of higher 
unemployment (Table 3). Average real wages again declined very dramatically between 1982 and 1983, 
partly as a result of the productive recession and growing unemployment, hut also due to the elimination 
of the legal wage indexation system established in 1979. Between 1982 and 1985, real wages further 
declined along with unemployment, the index reaching a value of 93 this later year (Index 1980=100), 
which compared poorly with the level of 109 seen in 1981. it is important to note that this latter level 
21 It is important to insist in that this rate more than doubled the historical average and that it was 
present after five years in which the GDP grew at an average per capita rate of more than 5.5 percent 
p.a.. 
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was still below the 1970 value. After $985, average real wages increased slightly, more notably in the 
case of manufacturing as real wages resembled the observed behavior of labor productivity. The 
informal sector real wage (Table 3, Col.(4)) shows a marked decline in 1972-75, hut a much more 
marked increase than average wages until 1982. Afterwards, the behavior of both series (average wages 
and informal sector wages) is quite different: average wages dropped by 4 percent in 1982-87, while 
informal sector wages declined by almost 50 percent. In the period 1987-90, on the contrary, informal 
sector wages increased by 42 percent in real terms, while average wages did it in only 12 percent. It is 
important to note, in this respect, that the informal sector is mostly made by selfemployed, whose wages 
situation is clearly more sensitive to open unemployment.22 
According to the Gini coefficients and the share of the poorest 40 percent in total income, 
the distributive situation markedly worsened during the adjustment of the 1970s, at least comparing 1980 
with the prevailing situation in 1960/65 (Table 4, Col.(3)). The improvement seen in the late 1980s with 
regard to the Gini coefficients tir the family income distribution was notable, closely resembling the path 
of reduction in open unemployment: the Ginis (Table 4), increased notably in 1974-1976 to decline only 
slightly afterwards (between 1976 and However, the income share of the poorest 40 percent did 
not experienced the dramatic improvement seen during this period in distributive indicators, given that 
income share of the poorest was similar in 1989 to that prevailing in 1981. Nonetheless, the situation 
of the poorest 40 percent recovered during the 1980s; as the fiscal social expenditure declined between 
1984-90 (Table 4, Col.(5), the recovery in the income share of the poorest suggests the higher efficiency 
and equity impact of public expenditures after the l980s' social retirms. 
Strikingly, during the expansionary years 1979-1981 -- and amid a financial boom -- the 
observed income distribution, proxied by the Gini coefticients, further deteriorated (Table 4), an outcome 
which would be consistent with the observed unemployment persistence and low real wage levels still 
22 As explained in Table 3, the informal sector wage is proxied by the hourly labor income of self- 
employed with low skill levels. The drop in informal sector wages is a likely explanation for the 
declining relative wage skilled/unskilled examined by Robbins in this same volume. This result would 
also he suggested by comparing the average and informal sector wages presented in Table 3. However, 
using the same data source (University of Chile) and wage concept, it is observed that the ratio of wages 
skilled/unskilled (Table 3, Col (5)) has remained fairly stable in a long term context. 
23 In Table 4 we include two alternative Gini coefficients for the family income distribution. To 
calculate the one in col (I), households are ranked by total income, while the second one (col (2)) uses 
a ranking of households by their per capita income (Riveros & Weher, 1988). However, similar 
conclusions are reached in analyzing both coefficients. The information used corresponds to the Santiago 
Labor Force Survey (University of Chile). 
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existing during that period. Nonetheless, estimated Gini coefficients based upon Santiago data (Table 4), 
are probably providing a partial picture of the distributive situation, as the regions of the country were 
undergoing an important economic progress by the late 1980s. As a matter of fact, the relative 
worsening in Gini coefficients in the late 1 980s is not supported by the national evidence presented in 
Table 5 which indicates a strong distributive improvement, especially after 1983/84. 
During the 1980s there was an increasing array of monetary and non-monetary subsidies 
targeted to the poor24, whose effects are not necessarily reflected in labor incomes and, thus makes the 
interpretation of many distributive indicators controversial. As Riveros & Weher (1987) have shown, 
the effect of considering the various subsidies into the income definition, makes a notable difference with 
regard to measurement poverty. Overall, however, the negative social effects of the adjustment of the 
I 970s and the crisis of the early I 980s were high in distributive terms. To a large extent, this result was 
due to the absence of an adequate to alleviate the situation of the unemployed and the 
poor; in addition to the lack of enough reactive social policies aimed at protecting the poor 
during the transition, there was an absence of proactive policies aimed at facilitating the labor reallocation 
process. These failures created unnecessary social friction, and may have delayed the adjustment process 
due to the reduction in credibility and sustainability. The lack of appropriate social policies during the 
I 970s and early I 980s, probably obeyed to the assumed perception that the adjustment process was going 
to be shorter than it actually was, making unnecessary a significant social reform. In turn, this view can 
he traced to the lack of precedents for an adjustment case of the magnitude of that seen in Chile. 
In 1976-1979 the need for lower inflation and fiscal discipline led to a severe decline in 
social outlays, particularly in health and education (Box 2) which apparently magnified the impact of the 
adjustment on the prevailing poverty situation. After 1980, the observed increase in social outlays (Col 
(4) Table 4) is associated with the privatization of the social security system and unemployment 
subsidies25, and it does not necessarily mean that there were more resources devoted to deal with 
24 This included not only the unemployed --for whom a whole variety of alternative subsidies were 
created-- hut also for the groups such as the elderly, women, children attending public schools, etc. - 
Unemployment subsidies are included in Box 2 in the category of "Other" fiscal social 
expenditures. These figures indicate an important decline in value since 1989, as a consequence of the 
elimination of massive unemployment. 
20 
structural This is clearly reflected in the series included in Box 2, which reveal the significant 
increase in the importance of social security payments as a proportion of the social fiscal spending and 
GDP. In turn, the declining social outlays after 1985 are associated with fiscal restraint and with 
improvement in some labor market outcomes, particularly the decline in open unemployment21. This 
decrease in the level of social outlays took place in combination with a better targeting of the poorest 
groups, facilitated by the early 1980s reforms of the social sector implemented during the early 1980s - 
-particularly the decentralization and the creation of specific subsidies . In general, however, problems 
of access and financing of the health and education systems are still of paramount importance in Chile, 
challenging policy makers with the need of making the economic program distributionally more equitable 
and politically more sustainable. 
With regard to poverty, by the end of the 1980s the proportion of poor households was estimated 
to be as high as 40 percent. This indicator, although disputable in terms of customary methodological 
grounds, reflects the severity of the productive shock of the early 1980s combined with stubborn labor 
market disequilibria. It is important to note that subsequent measures of the absolute poverty level in 
Chile, has shown a significant decline, as the economy continues in a high-growth path and the social 
policy has continued refining its targeting methods (Pardo, An important note to make to this 
respect is that although there has been a clear improvement in poverty (as for instance revealed by the 
income share of the lowest quintile (Table 5), this has also been, the case of the share of the highest 
quintile, particularly up to 1987. Therefore, the adjustment experience has led to a deterioration of 
quintiles 2, 3 and 4 in terms of their income sharing. This gives support to the claim that the middle 
class has been the one most damaged from a welfare viewpoint due, particularly for having it lost access 
The privatization of the social security system implied a notable increase in fiscal spending, due 
to the need of paying out the commitments associated to the former system. The importance of social 
security outlays, as a proportion of the GDP, went from 2.5 percent in 1970, to 6.6 percent in 1992 
(Box 2).. 
21 See, to this respect, the column "Others" in Box 2, which includes unemployment compensation 
outlays, and dropped from 3.4 percent of the GDP in 1985 to an only 1.2 percent in 1992. 
The CASEN (Chilean Socieconomic Survey) allowed to estimate the total poverty, including access 
to monetary subsidies. In 1987 there were a 38.2 percent of poor households, while in 1990 and 1992 
that number notably declined to 34.5 percent and 27.7 percent respectively. The critical poverty (also 
called structural in the literature), which corresponds to those whose income does not reach the poverty 
line, and present unsatisfied basic needs, reached in the same years, 16.8, 13.8 and 9.0 percent 
respectively. 
21 
to the complex and fruitful system of subsidies existing prior to the economic reforms and thereuction 
and targeting of social expenditures. 
4. LESSONS OF THE CHILEAN ADJUSTMENT EXPERIENCE 
This section attempts to list the most important implications of the Chilean experience for 
other LDCs needing stabilization and adjustment. The leading argument is that this experience is 
generally applicable to other countries in the region but that the idea of simple repLication is clearly 
inappropriate. Some crucial policy lessons and some broad policy guidelines taken from the chilean 
experience are helpful in designing adjustment packages in other countries. However, country-specific 
factors, and the positive effects of the recent wave of liberalization and globalization on reform prospects 
for any individual country, are key elements that should he taken into account betbre considering any 
direct appLication of the Chilean experience. 
There are four general qualifications that must he taken into account in considering the 
pertinence of the chilean reforms for other experiences. (I) it is important to note that the chilean 
reforms were undertaken very early on, when world trends were still favorable to trade protectionism, 
and government intervention was felt indispensable to achieve growth and equity. The present wave of 
economic globalization and the almost undisputed leading role given to the private sector in any economic 
strategy, have totally changed that political scenario. This change allows for a higher political support, 
and a more sustainable economic program than the one applied in Chile in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
(2) all the available battery of lending programs and financial assistance from industrial countries and 
international agencies, which are now supporting the implementation of neoconservative structural 
changes in most LDCs, did not constitute a possibility to finance the cost of the transition in Chile; 
reforms were implemented in absence of a lending program for the PUrPOSeS of introducing adjustment 
policies, particularly during the stabilization phase of the 1970s. (3) The chilean experience is 
particularly irrelevant for other countries with regard to the application of policies to ameliorate the social 
cost of the adjustment. The unavailability of a suitable lending program, and the practical irrelevance 
of it after the financial crisis, made the attainment of specific adjustment targets more difficult and 
probably more costly from a social viewpoint. (4) It is also important to consider that the Chilean 
experience did not have any precedent, this originating unnecessary elongations, mistakes, policy 
reversals and, at the end, higher adjustment costs. Naturally, countries currently undergoing economic 
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reforms have the advantage of knowing the background of Chile and other countries which have had 
different degree of success regarding their reform experience. 
On the other hand, the basic problems confronting the Chilean economy at the beginning 
of the 1970s, and at the outset of the 1980s, are still characteristics of other Latin American countries. 
Some, like Brazil, are suffering from persistent inflationary pressures and fiscal/monetary 
mismanagement, requiring profound stabilization programs. This is also the case of middle level-inflation 
countries such as Ecuador and Uruguay. For them, lesson of the Chilean experience--ratifying direct 
implications of economic theory-- is the unavoidable need for stabilization based upon standard fiscal and 
monetary policies, which must precede the adoption of structural adjustment measures. Today it is an 
accepted fact that before any productive restructuring led by the private sector can take place, a reduction 
in state intervention and the alignment of relative prices is indispensable. This principle also recognizes 
the fact that only in a free market environment it would he possible to attain an adequate supply response 
to policies seeking a resource reallocation towards expoandin economic sectors. 
In other countries, such as Costa Rica, El Salvador and Peru, a comprehensive agenda of 
structural changes is underway, including a public sector reform and privatization of public enterprises, 
a financial sector reform and the adoption of export promotion policies, particularly through measures 
regarding the exchange rate and the fiscal side. In this connection, the Chilean economy provides an 
useful framework regarding the sequencing of policy measures and the priorities in designing a reform 
agenda. Jointly with other adjustment experiences of more modern fashion, such as those from 
Argentina, and Mexico, thur fundamental policy lessons are consistent with the Chilean 
stabilization/adjustment experience, applicable to countries in either of the two situations (pre and post 
stabilization) aforementioned. 
(I) There are usually two phases in adopting adjustment packages. This is important because 
a proper sequencing of stabilization and structural adjustment policies requires different policy instruments 
at different points in time. Also, because achieving the second phase require proper stabilization in place, 
allowing the price system to reflect the social cost of resources. During the first phase, standard fiscal 
and monetary policies are the key. Measures aimed at attaining a trade opening and at reducing the size 
of the public sector, are normally important in order to complement the stabilization agenda, while at the 
same time they constitute key signals for the private sector and a necessary preparation for the structural 
change. During the second phase privatization of public firms is one of the most important policy 
actions, requiring a financial sector reform to allow the capital market to allocate resources in alternative 
projects. At the same time, consolidation of the trade and financial opening up, decentralizing the social 
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sectors, promoting exports and introducing labor market flexibility are paramount measures in order to 
achieve a structural change in relative prices, production, employment and property. 
(2) The adjustment Drocess takes a very long time. The degree of political and social 
control is important, but not decisive, to success. As the Eastern Europe and Russia cases suggest, the 
availability of previous experiences and financial assistance is also important hut not crucial in producing 
a shorter transition. There is a learning process for the population as a whole, and for the new 
entrepreneurial groups that will arise as a result of a more deregulated and competitive economic 
environment. And this process is necessarily time-intensive. Labor should also experience profound 
changes towards more modern unions, able to negotiate on more technical grounds; and labor 
reallocation from contracting to expanding industries --normally affected by significant skill mismatching-- 
must take place, raising questions about the effectiveness of the program in the meantime. Changes in 
all markets and the new regulatory policies needed by a market economy will also demand a substantial 
learning process. In addition to the natural slowness of the transition, it is important to realize that 
making mistakes and suffering policy reversals is unavoidable in any adjustment experience. This 
lengthens the adjustment process and makes it more difficult to attain the desirable political sustainability 
of reform programs. This problem goes necessarily beyond the economic dimension, needing broad 
political agreements which should exceed any specific administration. 
(3) Apart from obvious equity considerations, social policies are paramount to gain Dolitical 
credibility and achieve sustainable economic reforms. Targeting the poor, introducing more efficiency 
to traditional social sectors, and creating decentralization towards local governments and specific groups, 
are paramount to reduce social costs in the presence of significant fiscal constraints. This aspect is still 
more important in considering that the middle class will necessarily he the major losser during the 
adjustment, particularly due to the greater fiscal stringency. In the chilean this was not a key concern 
in the 1970s, in the assumption that adjustment was going to he attained more rapidly than it actually was. 
Hence, this created significant difficulties which could he managed only in the particular poJitical 
environment prevailing in Chile in 1973-90, hut it notably diminished the political credibility needed to 
substantially encourage private investment. 
(4) Labor market reforms are indispensable early in the program in order to attain a flexible 
responde in terms of interindustry labor mobility. Absence of appropriate reform lengthens the period 
in which the economy suffers from high unemployment. At the same time, deregulating the labor market 
is crucial to attain more flexibility, this being a crucial factor in Latin America, given the tradition of 
heavy government intervention in labor markets. However, as the Chilean experience suggests, it is 
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wrong to pursue the virtual elimination of typical policies and institutions, as job security, non-wage 
compensations, right to unionize etc. Such actions do not contribute to improve credibility, but do 
notably reduce any possibility of attaining union support. In this sense, it may be highly advisable to 
organize coalitions aimed at transforming traditional labor market policies in a way consistent with a 
modern adjusting economy. 
S. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A series of stabilization policies, which implied --in addition to standard macroeconomic 
policies— reducing the economic size of the State, deregulating the product and factor markets and 
opening the economy to foreign trade were of paramount importance in Chile during the 1970s. After 
the financial crisis of the 1980s, the Chilean economy underwent another wave of significant structural 
adjustment policies, the success of which was partly expedited by the economic reforms carried out in 
the late l970s and early 1980s. The post-crisis policy was characterized by the achievement of significant 
real devaluations, a far reaching privatization, significant reforms in the social arena, the promotion of 
non-traditional exports, and financial policies to deal with both the external debt problem and the need 
of increasing investment. The results of the adjustment process in terms of the labor market were 
dramatic: open unemployment and real wages suffered severe dislocations during the 1970s and 1980s, 
due to both the stabilization phase and the financial crisis. In general, the adjustment involved 
substantial social COStS, which were relatively well cushioned in the late 1980s by the targeting of fiscal 
social expenditures to the poor, hut could have been further reduced were more proactive and reactive 
social policies used more extensively and earlier during the adjustment process. 
The Chilean experience indicates that a sustainable adjustment process takes a long time, 
and that the distinction between the stabilization and the structural adjustment phases is a crucial one with 
regard to sequencing and the adoption of optimal policy instruments. It also indicates that liberalizing 
the labor market, through politically sustainable reforms, is crucial in flexibly achieving the necessary 
inter-industry labor mobility. Adequate proactive and reactive social policies, in the context of fiscal 
constraints, and aimed at protecting the poor, are fundamental not only on equity grounds, but also to 
attain program credibility. Overall, replication of the Chilean experience in detail is not a reasonable 
prospect for other countries, not only because of the particular political conditions o each case, but also 
because of the timing and the very different international environment prevailing for current adjustment 
efforts relative to those which Chile confronted. 
Table I 
Chile Macroeconomic Indicators 
T=Tradahle; NT= Non-Tradable; lnv Investment; C.Acc. = Current Account; Def=Deficit. 
Tradahies includes agriculture, fishing, mining and manufacturing. Non-tradahies includes construction and 
services. CM inflation end M I growth correspond to the December to December change in the variable. 
The Real effective exchange rate is the real multilateral exchange rate in terms of the wholesale prices of 
trading partners and Chile's cpi. 
The average ratio investment to GDP during 1960-69 was 14.9%. 
(I), (2). (3), (5), (6), and (7), Indicadores Economicos y Sociales, 1960-85, Banco Central de Chile (1987), 
IBRD: Chile's Country Economic Memonmdurn (1990) and Ministry of Finance: Estado de Is Hacienda 
Püblica (1993) (fiscal deficit since 1989); (4), (Cortazar & Marshall (l979);(6) and (8), Corbo (1985), IMF 
International Financial Statistics and Comentarios sobre Ia situación económica 1994; U. of Chile, 
Macroeconomic Chapter (P.-Mujica and M.-Besch) (9), Cottani (1987) & 1DB Progreso Económico y Social 
an latina 1994. 
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Output Output Gross Fiscal C.Acc. Real 
GDP Growth Growth CPI Ml mv. Del. Del. Exch. 
Growth (T) (NT) lnfl. Growth --- (Percent of GDP)--- Rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1970 2.1 1.4 2.9 32.5 66.2 16.4 2.7 -1.2 38.5 
1971 9.0 9.2 8.8 22.1 113.4 14.5 10.7 -1.9 35.3 
1972 -1.2 -0.8 -Ii 260.5 151.8 12.2 13.0 -4.0 36.7 
1973 -5.6 -7.3 -3.7 605.1 362.9 7.8 24.7 -2.7 56.7 
1974 1.0 6.6 -0.4 369.2 231.2 21.2 10.5 -2.6 83.8 
1975 -12.9 -16.6 -8.4 343.3 257.2 13.1 2.6 -6.8 100.0 
1976 3.5 5.3 1.6 197.9 189.4 12.8 2.3 1.5 91.5 
1977 9.9 7.8 9.4 84.2 113.5 14.4 1.8 -4.1 83.5 
1978 8.2 4.5 9.6 37.2 65.0 17.8 0.8 -7.1 101.6 
1979 8.3 7.0 10.0 38.9 57.8 17.8 -1.7 -5.7 105.9 
1980 7.8 5.5 31.2 64.0 21.0 -3.1 -7.1 94.0 
1981 5.5 3.8 5.4 9.5 -3.8 22.7 -1.7 -14.5 74.8 
1982 -14.1 -11.2 -10.8 20.7 7.3 11.3 2.3 -9.5 81.1 
1983 -0.7 0.5 -6.1 23.1 27.7 9.8 3.8 -5.6 98.1 
1984 6.3 7.9 5.3 23.0 12.1 13.6 4.0 -10.7 100.8 
1985 2.4 2.5 2.4 26.4 11.3 13.7 6.3 -8.3 123.0 
1986 5.7 6.7 5.0 17.4 41.4 14.6 2.8 -6.5 139.9 
1987 5.7 3.5 6.6 21.5 9.8 16.9 -0.1 -4.6 143.5 
1988 7.4 6.9 7.7 12.7 17.7 17.0 -1.7 3.0 149.9 
1989 10.0 8.4 11.0 21.4 13.2 25.5 -1.8 -2.1 146.4 
1990 2.1 0.7 3.0 27.3 17.5 24.7 -0.8 -1.9 151.9 
1991 6.1 5.0 6.7 18.7 54.0 22.2 -1.6 -1.7 147.2 
1992 10.3 7.1 12.0 12.7 16.8 24.1 -2.3 -2.0 132.1 





Chile: External Sector (b) 
1212 12!Q 12!! 12!! 12!! 12M 12!! 12!! 12!! 12!! 1229 1221 1221 
I. Extenial Debt 
(a)To1aI 8.49 11.80 15.50 17.10 17.40 18.90 19.30 l9.40 19.10 17.60 16.30 1740 16.40 18.30 19.20 
Inerest 0.67 0.93 1.46 1.92 1.75 2.02 1.90 1.89 1.70 1.60 1.70 1.92 1.81 1.86 1.50 
(c) Deht/Exporla (%) 2.70 2.40 4.10 4.60 4.60 5.20 5.10 4.60 3.70 2.51 2.00 2.09 1.84 1.83 2.08 
(d)Deht/ONP(%) 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.80 1.00 1.10 1.40 1.30 1.20 1.10 0.90 0.U 0.52 0.47 0.47 
2. Export,(FOfl) 
(a)Tradilionala 2.16 2.62 2.18 2.12 2.34 1.96 2.12 2.10 2.60 3.85 4.82 4.59 4.39 4.22 3.98 
(b)Non-Traditional 1.68 2.09 1.66 1.5$ 1.50 (.69 1.6$ 2.10 2.62 3.20 3.26 3.72 4.54 5.27 5.22 
(c)Tolal 3.84 4.61 3.84 3.71 3.83 3.65 3.80 4.20 5.22 7.05 8.08 8.31 8.93 9.99 9.20 
3. Importz(CIF) 
(a) Consumer Goods 1.33 2.07 2.73 1.48 1.02 1.04 0.75 0.75 0.90 1.01 1.49 0.8 1.13 1.69 (.90 
(b) Capital Goods 0.95 1.27 1.45 0.70 • 0.39 0.60 0.65 0.74 1.10 1.37 1.95 2.13 1.84 2.57 3.04 
(c)Total Imports 4.71 6.15 7.32 3.69 2.85 3.29 2.96 3.10 3.99 4.83 6.50 7.02 7.45 9.46 10.54 
Trade (1980=100) 118.50 100.00 84.30 80.40 87.50 83.20 78.50 82.00 77.00 93.30 92.10 82.56 82.09 81.31 74.21 
Nole: Figures are expressed in of current US dollars. 
Traditional exports include copper and mining. 
Non-traditional exports are agricultural and industrial products. 
Sources: (l).(2) and (3): Boletin Mensual. Banco Central de Chile and International Financial Statistics. Yearbook. FMI, 1994 
(4): Corbo & Sturzenegger (1988). 
Table 3 
Chile: Real Wa2es 
(Index: 1980=100) 
--—--------—---Source: [NE --—---—--- --—--------Source: University of Chile 
Minimum Average Manuf. Inf. Sector Labor Unemployment Skilled W, 
Wage Wage Wage Wage Cost (US$) Rate Un.skill W, 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1970 81.0 109.7 97.1 124.1 0.69 5.7 116.1 
1971 106.8 134.1 106.6 133.7 1.09 3.8 136.7 
1972 101.7 119.0 101.2 138.4 1.06 3.1 113.4 
1973 46.2 73.1 68.4 99.0 0.58 4.8 95.0 
1974 90.6 70.2 62.2 94.5 0.53 9.4 83.0 
1975 105.1 62.5 58.3 77.3 0.43 15.5 86.3 
1976 100.1 78.9 78.6 77.0 0.60 20.6 101.1 
1977 84.6 79.9 78.6 80.3 0.88 19.2 111.7 
1978 97.4 85.0 87.4 82.4 1.06 18.0 119.4 
1979 98.3 92.0 94.2 102.6 1.28 17.2 101.2 
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.45 16.5 100.0 
1981 111.0 108.8 115.5 120.4 2.42 15.1 98.6 
1982 122.2 108.6 110.7 126.6 2.08 25.7 105.3 
1983 93.2 97.0 102.9 80.9 1.30 30.1 118.5 
1984 82.1 97.1 99.0 77.8 1.13 22.9 115.0 
1985 74.3 93.0 97.1 75.6 0.77 20.9 98.1 
1986 78.8 95.0 101.9 64.4 0.78 18.0 103.4 
1987 66.9 93.1 103.2 63.1 0.81 15.2 103.3 
1988 74.2 98.6 109.8 64.3 0.92 13.1 104.0 
1989 80.1 100.4 111.8 65.5 0.98 10.1 109.3 
1990 87.9 104.7 116.1 89.4 1.11 9.0 110.3 
1991 101.0 109.9 123.8 88.4 1.28 6.5* 93.0 
1992 108.1 118.4 129.7 108.4 1.33 88.0 
1993 119.6 119.0 133.1 129.5 1.42 4.6* 92.6 
Note: (I): :two legal minimums exist ed in 1970: for white and blue collar workers. The latter is u sed here. 
(2): Average Wages National Yearly Averages for all skills. 
(3): Manufacturing sectot wages. Yearly Average for all skilla 
(4): Urban Informal sector wage. proxied by the average hourly income of self employed workers with less than 8 years of formal 
schooling: it has also been reported as unakilled wage" in the free sector of the economy (informal sector). Figurea correspoind to May 
of each year. 
(5): Labor Coals corresponds to the wage of unskilled Mhor in the manufacturing sector, plus fringe benefits, expressed in hourly 
(nominal) US dollars. 
(6) : indicatea that the source ia the National Bureau of Statistics (INE). 
(7): The skilled wage correspond to blue and white collar workers employed in the formal aector. with * or more years of schooling. The 
unskilled wage corresponds to that reported in (4). 
Sources: (I). (2) and (3): INE; (4) Paredea (1987) & University of Chile Labor force surveys: May of each year; (5) Riveroa (19*8) ; (6) 
University of Chile: (7) Paredea (1987). 
All the wage data have been deflated by the average corrected CPI based in INE. Yañez (1979) and Cortazar-Marahall (1979). 
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Table 4 
Chile: Social Indicators 
Fiscal Per Capita 
Gini Coefficient In come Share of Social GDP 
(1) (2) 40% Poorest Expenditure (1976 US$) 
1960 0.4590 0.4012. 13.59 n.a. n.a. 
1965 0.4750 n.a. 12.87 n.a. n.a. 
1968 0.4980 n.a. 11.70 n.a. 1,114 
1970 0.5010 0.4345 11.50 n.a. I,137 
1974 0.4499 0.4232 n.a. 11.08 1,090 
1975 0.4710 0.4127 12.78 10.30 0,933 
1976 0.5380 0.4886 n.a. 9.99 0,950 
1977 0.5260 0.4762 n.a. 10.56 1,026 
1978 0.5197 0.4662 n.a. 10.16 1,091 
1979 0.5179 n.a. n.a. 9.25 1,162 
1980 0.5257 n.a. 10.88 10.29 1,231 
1981 0.5220 0.4788 11.24 12.80 1,277 
1982 0.5390 n.a. 9.95 15.76 1,078 
1983 0.5420 n.a. 10.07 15.10 1,052 
1984 0.5550 0.5151 9.33 15.40 1,100 
1985 0.5320 0.5011 10.13 15.12 1,108 
1986 0.5390 0.4997 10.00 14.30 1,230 
1987 0.5310 0.4950 10.22 13.97 1,271 
1988 0.5431 0.5012 10.91 14.01 1,312 
1989 0.5523 0.5001 11.61 14.03 1,442 
1990 0.5422 0.4987 11.72 14.02 1,516 
1991 0.5391 0.4967 11.84 14.46 1,599 
1992 0.5340 0.4951 12.01 14.70 1,760 
Notes: (I) based on total family income, representing the Greater Santiago Area. 
(2) Eatimates based GO per capita family income, representing the Greater Santiago Ares. 
Sources: (I). (2) and Riveros & Weber (1987); (4): Torche (1985) and data; (5): World Tables, The World Bank 
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Table 5 
Chile: Income Distribution 1980-91 
(percentages) 
Quintiles 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
1 4.6 4.2 3.2 3.4 3.8 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.7 
2 9.0 8.5 8.2 8.3 7.7 8.3 8.0 7.8 8.2 8.9 8.5 8.3 
3 12.7 12.7 12.0 11.8 11.7 11.9 11.6 11.5 12.6 12.8 12.2 12.3 
4 18.7 19.4 19.3 19.1 18.1 18.6 18.3 18.2 19.1 19.6 18.8 17.8 
5 55.0 55.1 57.3 57.5 58.7 57.1 58.1 58.4 55.5 53.9 56.0 56.9 
Figures correspond to the share of the total family income in the total national income. The Quintile distribution was 
prepared on the basis of the per capita family income. Data corresponds to the national household survey of the 
University of Chile. 
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